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Abstract—Over-sharing poorly-worded thoughts and personal
information is prevalent on online social platforms. In many of
these cases, users regret posting such content. To retrospectively
rectify these errors in users’ sharing decisions, most platforms
offer (deletion) mechanisms to withdraw the content, and social
media users often utilize them. Ironically and perhaps unfor-
tunately, these deletions make users more susceptible to privacy
violations by malicious actors who specifically hunt post deletions
at large scale. The reason for such hunting is simple: deleting a
post acts as a powerful signal that the post might be damaging to
its owner. Today, multiple archival services are already scanning
social media for these deleted posts. Moreover, as we demonstrate
in this work, powerful machine learning models can detect
damaging deletions at scale.
Towards restraining such a global adversary against users’
right to be forgotten, we introduce Deceptive Deletion, a de-
coy mechanism that minimizes the adversarial advantage. Our
mechanism injects decoy deletions, hence creating a two-player
minmax game between an adversary that seeks to classify dam-
aging content among the deleted posts and a challenger that
employs decoy deletions to masquerade real damaging deletions.
We formalize the Deceptive Game between the two players,
determine conditions under which either the adversary or the
challenger provably wins the game, and discuss the scenarios
in-between these two extremes. We apply the Deceptive Deletion
mechanism to a real-world task on Twitter: hiding damaging
tweet deletions. We show that a powerful global adversary can
be beaten by a powerful challenger, raising the bar significantly
and giving a glimmer of hope in the ability to be really forgotten
on social platforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Every day, millions of users share billions of (often
personal) posts on online social media platforms like Face-
book and Twitter. This information is routinely archived and
analyzed by multiple third parties ranging from individuals
to state-level actors [20], [27], [43], [44], [55], [58], [59],
[63]. Although the majority of these social media posts are
benign, users also routinely post regrettable content on social
media [22], [60], [72] that they later wish to retract. Subse-
quently, most social platforms provide user-initiated deletion
mechanisms that allow users to rectify their sharing decisions
and delete past posts. Not surprisingly, users take advantage of
these deletion mechanisms enthusiastically—Mondal et al. [49]
showed that nearly one-third of six-year-old Twitter-posts were
deleted. In another work, Tinati et al. [62] showed that this
number is much higher in Instagram, where almost half of the
pictures posted within a six month period had been removed.
Ironically, current user-initiated deletion mechanisms may
have an unintended effect: third-party archival services can
*Both authors contributed equally and are considered co-first authors.
identify deleted posts and infer that deleted posts might contain
damaging content from the post creator’s point of view (i.e.,
having an adverse effect on the personal/professional life of the
content creator). In other words, deletion might inadvertently
make it easier to identify damaging content. Indeed, today
it is possible to detect deletions at scale: Twitter, for one,
advertises user deletions in their streaming API 1 via deletion
notifications [5], [6] so that third-party developers can remove
these posts from their database. Similarly, Pushshift [15],
[23] is an archival system for all the contents on Reddit
and Removeddit [16] uses this archive to publicize all the
deleted posts and comments on Reddit. A malicious data-
collector can simply leverage these notifications to flag deleted
posts as possibly damaging and further use them against the
users [3], [4], [69]. Importantly, the hand-picked politicians
and celebrities are not the only parties at the receiving end
of these attacks. We find that the malicious data-collector can
develop learning models to automate the process and perform
an non-targeted (or global) attack at a large-scale; e.g., Fallait
Pas Supprimer [12] (i.e., “Should Not Delete” in English) is a
Twitter account that collects and publishes the deleted tweets
of not only the French politicians and celebrities but also
noncelebrity French users with less than a thousand followers.
Asking the users not to post regrettable content on social
platforms in the first place may seem like a good first step.
However, users cannot accurately predict what content would
be damaging to them in the future (e.g., after a breakup or
before applying to a job). Zhou et al. [72] and Wang et al. [65]
propose multiple types of classifiers (Naive Bayes, SVM, De-
cision Trees, and Neural Networks) to detect regrettable posts
using users’ history and to proactively advise users even before
the publication of posts. However, this proactive approach
cannot prevent users from publishing future-regrettable posts.
It is inevitable to focus on reactive mechanisms to assist users
with protecting their post deletions.
Recently Minaei et al. [48] proposed an intermittent with-
drawal mechanism to tackle this challenge of hiding user-
initiated deletions. They offer a deniability guarantee for user-
initiated deletions in the form of an availability-privacy trade-
off and ensure that when a post is deleted, the adversary
cannot be immediately certain if it was actually deleted or
temporarily made unavailable by the platform. Their trade-
off could be useful for future social and archival platforms;
however, in current commercial social media platforms like
Twitter, sacrificing even a small fraction of availability for all
the posts is undesirable.
1Twitter provides a random sample of the publicly posted Twitter data in
real time to the third parties via streaming API.
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To this end, our research question is straightforward, yet
highly relevant—can we enhance the privacy of the deleted and
possibly damaging posts at scale without excessively affecting
the functionality of the platform?
Contributions. We make the following contributions.
First, we demonstrate the impact of deletion detection
attacks by performing a proof-of-concept attack on real-world
social media posts to identify damaging content. Specifically,
we use a crowdsourced labeled corpus of (non)damaging
deleted posts from Twitter (more than 4, 000 tweets) to train
an adversary (a classifier). We demonstrate that our adversary
is capable of detecting damaging posts with high probability.
More precisely, our adversary can increase its F-score by
27 percentage points (56% increase) compared to a baseline
adversary which uses random guessing to detect damaging
posts. Thus, it is indeed feasible for the adversary to use
automated methods for detecting damaging posts at a large
scale (e.g., when focusing only on deleted posts). In fact, we
expect systems such as Fallait Pas Supprimer [12] to employ
analogous learning techniques soon to improve their detection.
Second, we identify that there are already deletion services
which enable users to delete their content in bulk (e.g.,
“twitWipe” [11] and “tweetDelete” [8] for Twitter, “Social
Book Post Manager” [17] for Facebook, “Cleaner for IG” [13]
for Instagram, “Nuke Reddit History” [14], and multiple bots
on RequestABot subreddit for Reddit). However, these bulk
deletions provide a clear signal to an adversary that the user is
trying to hide damaging content via deletion. To that end, we
introduce a novel deletion mechanism, Deceptive Deletions,
that raises the bar for the adversary in identifying damaging
content. Given a set of damaging posts (posts that adversary
can leverage to blackmail the user) that users want to delete,
the Deceptive Deletion system (also known as a challenger)
selects k additional posts for each damaging post and deletes
them along with the damaging posts. The system-selected
posts, henceforth called the decoy posts, are taken from a pool
of non-damaging non-deleted posts provided by volunteers.
Since a global adversary can only observe all of these deletions
together, his goal is to distinguish deleted damaging posts from
the deleted (non-damaging) decoy posts. Intuitively, Deceptive
Deletion is more effective if the selected decoy posts are
similar to the damaging posts. These two opposite goals create
a minmax game between the adversary and the challenger that
we further analyze.
Third, we introduce the Deceptive Learning Game, which
formally describes the minmax game between the adversary
and the challenger. We start by considering a static adversary
that tunes the parameters of its system (e.g., classifier for
determining the damaging posts) up until a certain point in
time. However, powerful adversaries are adaptive and continu-
ally tune their models as they obtain more deletions including
the decoy deletions made by the challenger. Therefore, in
the second phase, we consider an adaptive adversary and
describe the optimization problem of the adaptive adversary
and challenger as a minmax game.
We identify conditions under which either only the adaptive
adversary or only the challenger provably wins the minmax
game and discuss the scenarios in-between these two extremes.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to
develop a computational model for quantitative assessment
of the damaging deletions in the presence of both static and
adaptive adversaries.
Finally, we empirically demonstrate that with access to
a set of non-damaging volunteered posts, we can leverage
Deceptive Deletions to hide damaging deletions against both
static and adaptive adversary effectively. We use real-world
Twitter data to demonstrate the effectiveness of the challenger.
Specifically, we show that even when we consider only two
decoy posts per damaging deletion, the adversarial perfor-
mance (F-score) drops to 42% from 75% in the absence of
any privacy-preserving deletion mechanism.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Exisiting Content Deletion Mechanisms to Provide Privacy
Today, most archival and social media websites (e.g., Twitter,
Facebook) enable users to delete their content. Recent studies
[18], [49] show that a significant number of users deleted
content—35% of Twitter posts are deleted within six years of
posting them. This user-initiated deletion is also related to the
“Right to be Forgotten” [66], [69]. However, this user-initiated
content deletion suffered from the Streisand effect – attempting
to hide some information has the unintended consequence of
gaining more attention [69]. Consequently, there is a need to
provide deletion privacy to users.
In addition to user-initiated deletions, there exist some
premeditated withdrawal mechanisms where all historical con-
tent is eventually deleted automatically to provide deletion
privacy. These mechanisms can be broadly classified into
two categories. First, in age-based withdrawal, platforms like
Snapchat [1] and Dust [2] and systems like Vanish [37], [38]
and EphPub [26] automatically withdraw a piece of content
after a preset time. Second, to make premeditated withdrawal
more usable, Mondal et al. [49] proposed inactivity-based with-
drawal, where posts will be withdrawn only if they become
inactive, i.e., there is no interaction with the post for a specified
time period (e.g., no more views by other users).
However, even the premeditated withdrawals are not free
from problems of their own. First, all the posts will eventually
get deleted, removing all archival history from the platform.
Second, if posts are deleted before the preset time or in-spite of
high interaction, the adversary can be certain that the deletion
was user-intended, violating deletion privacy.
Minaei et al. [48] attempted to enable users to delete their
content while neither attracting attention to deleted content
nor deleting full historical archives. They presented a new
intermittent withdrawal mechanism for all non-deleted posts,
which provides a trade-off between availability and deletion
privacy. In a nutshell, their system ensures that if an adversary
found that a post if not available, then the adversary cannot
be certain if the post is user-deleted or simply taken down
by platform temporarily. Although this mechanism is useful
for large internet archives, in platforms such as Facebook and
Twitter, where content availability is crucial to the users and
platform, a privacy-availability trade-off might not be feasible.
Furthermore, the intermittent withdrawal mechanism does not
consider the adversary’s background knowledge about other
deleted posts. Our work aims to bridge this gap and provide a
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novel learning-based mechanism which considers an adaptive
adversary who aims to uncover tweet deletion. However, our
mechanisms is not without precedent, and it is inspired by
earlier work of obfuscation by noise injection.
Tianti et al. [62] offer intuitions for predicting posts dele-
tions on Instagram with the goal of managing the storage
of posts on the servers: Once a post is archived, it becomes
computationally expensive to erase it; thus, predicting deletions
can help in reducing the overheads of being compliant with
the “right to be forgotten” regulations. These predictions in
the non-adversarial setting, however, does not apply to our
minmax game between the adversary and the challenger.
Recently Garg et al. [36] formalize the right to be forgotten
using platforms as a cryptographic game. While being inter-
esting, their definitions and suggested tools such as history-
independent data structures are not applicable to our setting
where the adversary has continuous and complete access to
the collected data.
B. Obfuscation using Noise Injection
There has been a line of work in the area of (non-
cryptographic) private information retrieval [34], [42], [50],
[53] that obfuscates the users’ interest using dummy queries
as noise to avoid user profiling. Howe et al. proposed Track-
MeNot [7], [42], which issues randomized search queries
to popular search engines to prevent the search engines in
building any practical profile of the users based on their actual
queries. GooPIR [34] is a similar work that uses a Thesaurus
to obtain the keywords to constructs k − 1 other queries
(dummy ones) and submit all k queries at the same time.
This way, timing attacks by the search engines are eliminated.
However, it only addresses single keyword searches; these
schemes do not address full-sentence searches. Murugesan
et al. propose “Plausibly Deniable Search” (PDS) [50] that
analogous to GooPIR generates k − 1 dummy queries using
latent semantic indexing based approach. In their mechanisms,
each real query is converted into a canonical query which
protects against deanonymization attacks based on typos and
grammar mistakes. We note that all of the systems mentioned
so far consider hiding each query separately. However, a
determined adversary may be able to find a user’s interests
by observing a sequence of such obfuscated queries. Multiple
works have investigated such weaknesses [21], [53], [54].
Some relatively new techniques further try to overcome
these shortcomings by smartly generating the k − 1 queries.
For example, Petit et al. proposed PEAS [56], where they
provide a combination of unlinkability and indistinguishability.
However, apart from introducing an overhead for encrypting
the user queries, their method also requires two proxy servers
that are non-colluding, hence weakening the adversarial model.
K-subscription [51] is yet another work that proposes an
obfuscation based approach that enables the user to follow
privacy-sensitive channels in Twitter by requiring the users
to follow k − 1 other channels to hide the user interests
from the microblogging service. However, the K-subscription
has a negative social impact for the user as the user’s social
connections will see the user following these dummy channels.
These shortcomings, both social and technical, motivated our
particular design decision for Deceptive Deletions.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND OVERVIEW
A. System
We consider a data-sharing platform (e.g., Twitter or Face-
book) as the public bulletin board where individuals can upload
and view content. Users are the post owners that are able to
publish/delete their posts, and view posts from other users. In
this work, we consider discrete time intervals in which the
users upload and delete posts (Figure 1 1 ). A time interval
could be as small as a minute or even a week, depending on
the platform. We define two types of posts.
• User-deleted posts A user could delete a post for two
primary reasons [18], [48], [49]:
◦ Damaging posts: the post contained damaging content to
the user’s personal or professional life, or
◦ Non-damaging posts: the post was out-dated, contained
spelling mistakes, etc.
An adversary’s goal is to find the damaging posts among
all the deleted ones that could be used to blackmail the
corresponding owners of the post.
• Volunteered posts We consider a subset of non-deleted
posts that users willingly offer to be deleted to protect the
privacy of other users whenever needed. These volunteered
posts are non-damaging and cannot be used by the adversary
to blackmail the user of the post. We discuss the challenges
of obtaining volunteered posts in Section VI.
A challenger’s goal is to select a subset of volunteered
posts (i.e., non-damaging) and delete them such that the
aforementioned adversary is unable to distinguish between
the damaging and the non-damaging post deletions. We
denote the posts selected by the challenger as decoy posts.
Notation. We use a subscript t to denote the time interval and
superscripts δ,+, v, ∗ to denote the post type. In particular,
Dt is all the uploaded and deleted posts in time interval t.
Then we denote all the deleted posts (user- and challenger-
deleted) in that interval as Dδt , the damaging posts as D
+
t , and
volunteered posts by Dvt . The decoy posts that a challenger
selects for deletion to fool the adversary is denoted by G∗t .
Note that G∗t ⊆ Dvt ⊆ Dt\Dδt .
B. Adversary’s Actions and Assumptions
Task. At a given time interval, the task of the adversary is
to correctly label all the deleted posts as being damaging to
the post-owner or not. We do not focus on local attackers (or
stalkers) targeting individuals or small groups of users.2 Our
global adversary instead seeks damaging deletions on a large
scale, rummaging through all the deleted posts to find as many
damaging ones as possible. Fallait Pas Supprimer [12] (from
Section I) is a real-world example of the global adversary.
Data access. At any given time interval, we assume that the
adversary is able to obtain all the deleted posts by comparing
2Such stalkers can easily label their posts manually, and protecting against
such an attack is extremely hard if not impossible. For example, consider
the case that a stalker continuously takes snapshots of its targeted user profile
with the goal of identifying the user’s deletions. With its background/auxiliary
information about the user (i.e., knowing what contents are considered
sensitive to the target), the stalker can effectively identify the damaging
deletions. We claim that, in the current full-information model, protection
against such a local adversary is impossible.
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Time
Intervals
Interval t-1 Interval t
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1. Black-box (BB)
2. Restricted BB
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Deleted	posts ( )
Delete
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2
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 
Challenger
(at t - 1)
   
++
User-deleted
Challenger-deleted
∗
++
User-deleted
Challenger-deleted
∗
∗
     In each interval, users
delete their (non)damaging
posts and volunteer some of
their non-damaging post to
the challenger.  In addition,
the decoy posts from the
previous interval are deleted
   Challenger gets the
volunteered posts
and trains its model
by querying the
adversary. Next, it
selects the decoy
posts to be deleted in
the next interval.
   Adversary samples
p  deleted posts and
obtains the labels from
MT. Then using the
labels, trains its model
and classifies the rest
of the  deleted posts.
3
1 Volunteer
posts		( )
Volunteer
 
Fig. 1: Overview of Deceptive Deletions. In each interval, the deletions are shown by gray squares with ‘δ’. The deleted posts
could be of three types: users’ damaging deletions shown by red squares with ‘+’, users’ non-damaging deletions shown by
green squares with ‘−’ and challengers’ decoys posts shown by green squares with ‘∗’. Further, we denote the volunteer posts
offered to the challenger during each interval by green squares with ‘−’ to indicate that they are non-damaging.
different archived snapshots of the platform. Although this
strong data assumption benefits the adversary tremendously,
we show in Section V-D that Deceptive Deletions can protect
the users’ damaging deletions.
Labels. Our global, non-stalker adversary is not able to
obtain the true label (damaging or non-damaging) of the post
from the user. Instead, the adversary uses a crowdsourcing
service like Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [19] to obtain a proxy
for these true labels. Although the labels obtained from the
Mechanical Turkers (MTurkers) reflect societal values and not
the user’s intention, following previous work [65], we assume
they closely match the true labels in our experiments. This is
reasonable as the adversary can expend a significant amount
of effort and money to obtain these true labels, at least for
a small set of posts, that will ultimately be used to train a
machine learning model.
Budget. Since there is a cost associated with acquiring label
for each deleted post from the MTurkers, the aim of the
adversary is to learn to detect the damaging deletions under a
budget constraint. We consider two types of budget constraints:
• limited budget where the adversary can only obtain the
labels for a fixed number of posts Bstatic, and
• fixed recurring budget where the adversary obtains the
labels for a fixed number of posts Badapt in each interval.
The adversary with a limited budget is called the static
adversary since it does not train after exhausting its budget.
On the other hand, the adversary with a fixed recurring budget
keeps adapting to the new deletions in each time interval, and
hence is dubbed the adaptive adversary.
Player actions. At every time interval t, the adversary
obtains a set of posts Aδt for training by sampling part of
the deleted posts, say p, from Dδt , an operation denoted by
Aδt
p∼ Dδt . The adversary uses MTurk to label the sampled
dataset Aδt . After training, the task of the adversary is to
classify the rest of the deleted posts of that time interval.
Additionally, as the adversary gets better over time, it also
relabels all the posts deleted from the past intervals. The test
set for the adversary is all the deleted posts from current and
previous time intervals that were not used for training; i.e.,⋃
t′≤t(Dδt′ \ Aδt′). Figure 1 2 shows the adversary’s actions.
Note that although an adaptive adversary can sample p =
Badapt deleted posts at every time interval and use MTurkers
to label them, a static adversary can only obtain the labels
until it runs out of the limited budget (after τ = Bstatic/p time
intervals). After this period, a static adversary does not train
itself with new deleted posts.
Performance metrics. The adversary wishes to increase
precision and recall for the classification of deleted posts into
damaging and non-damaging sets. At every time interval t, we
report adversary’s F-score3 over the test set described above:
deleted posts of all the past intervals, i.e.,
⋃
t′≤t(Dδt′ \ Aδt′).
C. Challenger’s Actions and Assumptions
Task. In the presence of an adversary as described above,
the task of a challenger is to obtain volunteered posts (i.e.
non-damaging and non-deleted posts) from users, select a
subset of these posts and delete them in order to fool the
adversary into misclassifying these challenger-deleted posts as
damaging. The challenger is honest, does not collude with the
adversary, and works with the users (data owners) to protect
their damaging deletions. Other than the platforms themselves,
third party services such as “tweetDelete” [8] can take the
role of the challenger as well. In Appendix A, we discuss the
flaws in a possible alternate approach where the challenger
is allowed to generate tweets rather than select from pool of
volunteered posts.
3F-score = 2 · precision · recall/(precision+ recall)
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Data access. The challenger can be implemented by the
platform or a third-party deletion service [8]–[10], that has
access to the posts of the users. Additionally, we assume that
there are users over the platform who volunteer a subset of
their non-damaging posts to be deleted anytime (or within a
time frame) by the challenger, possibly, in return for privacy
benefits for their (and other users’) damaging deletions.
Labels. The challenger is implemented as part of the platform
(or a third-party service permitted by the user). Thus, unlike
the adversary that obtains proxy labels from crowdsourcing
platforms, it has access to the true labels— damaging or
non-damaging, from the owner of the post. This is easily
implemented: before deleting a post, the user can specify
whether the post is damaging (and needs protection).
Access to the adversary. The challenger not only knows the
presence of a global adversary trying to classify the deleted
posts into damaging and non-damaging posts but also can
observe its behaviour.4. As a result, we consider three types
of accesses to the adversary:
• no access where the challenger has no information about
the adversary.
• monitored black-box access with a recurring query bud-
get of Bg where the challenger can obtain the adversary’s
classification probability for a limited number of posts Bg
every time interval, but the access is monitored, i.e., the
adversary can take note of every post queried and treat them
separately.
• black-box access where the challenger can obtain the
adversary’s classification probabilities for any post.
Here, no access is the weakest assumption that defines the
lower-bounds for our challenger’s success. Nevertheless, we
expect the challenger to have some access to the adversary’s
classification. An unrestricted black-box access serves as an
upper bound for the challenger assuming that it can train a
precise surrogate model of the adversary’s classifier using its
own training data. While employing such a surrogate model is
common practice in the literature [45], [52], it can be hard to
obtain in real world without knowing the adversary’s exact ar-
chitecture and training data. Our monitored black-box assump-
tion with a recurring query budget (henceforth, interchangeably
called the restricted black-box access) balances practicality
of the access versus the feasibility of defending against an
adversary with that access. In Section IV, we introduce three
challengers (oracle, D2 and random) corresponding to the three
types of accesses.
Player actions. At every time interval t, the challenger
receives new volunteer posts from the users and adds them
to a set that stores the volunteered posts collected up until
this point. Next, based on the type of access, it obtains the
adversary’s classification probabilities for some number of
volunteer posts (the number is dependent on the access which
we detail in Section IV). Finally, it selects decoy posts, a subset
of the volunteered posts collected up until this point and deletes
these posts in interval t+1 (hence the adversary sees these
challenger-deleted posts in interval t+1 as part of the deleted
set Dδt+1). Figure 1 3 shows the challenger’s actions.
4Fallait Pas Supprimer [12] posts all its output on Twitter itself
Performance metrics. The challenger, in direct contrast
to the adversary, wishes to decrease adversary’s precision
and recall for the classification of deleted posts. Adversary’s
precision will decrease if it classifies the injected decoy posts
as damaging (increased false-positives). On the other hand,
adversary’s recall will decrease if it learns to be conservative
in order to ignore the decoy posts (increased false-negatives).
IV. THE DECEPTIVE LEARNING GAME
The deceptive learning game is a two-player zero-sum
non-cooperative game over time intervals t = 1, 2, ... (units)
between an adversary who wishes to find users’ damaging dele-
tions, and a challenger who wishes to hide the said damaging
deletions. The challenger achieves this by deleting volunteers’
non-damaging posts as decoys. While the adversary’s goal is to
maximize its precision/recall scores on the classification task,
the challenger’s goal is to minimize them.
We denote each post by (x, y), where x ∈ X represents the
features of the post (i.e., text, comments, etc.) and y ∈ {0, 1}
denotes its true label such that y = 1 if the post is damaging
and y = 0 if it is non-damaging. In the following subsections,
we describe the actions of each player in the time interval t.
A. Adversary
We denote the adversary’s classifier at the beginning of
interval t by a( · ; θt−1) : X→ [0, 1] parameterized by θt−1
such that a(x; θt−1) := P (yˆ = 1 | x; θt−1) is the predicted
probability of the post x being damaging. The adversary
collects all the deletions that happen in this interval (i.e., Dδt )
and samples p posts, denoted by Aδt . The adversary then uses
MTurk to obtain a proxy for the true labels of these p posts.
The adversary uses this labeled training data in the follow-
ing optimization problem to update its parameters,
θt = arg min
θ
LNLL(θ;Aδt ) , (1)
where LNLL is the standard negative log-likelihood loss for the
classification task, given by,
LNLL(θ;Aδt ) =
∑
(x,y)∈Aδt
−y log (a(x; θ))− (1− y) log (1− a(x; θ)) .
After training, the adversary uses the trained model a( · ; θt)
to predict the labels of the rest of the deleted posts of time
interval t, i.e., Dδt \Aδt along with all the deleted posts that it
had already predicted in the past. This way the adversary hopes
to capture damaging posts that were missed earlier. Hence, we
report the adversary’s performance on all the past deletions
(not including the training data):
⋃
t′≤t(Dδt′ \ Aδt′).
Static vs Adaptive Adversary. Since the static adversary has
a limited budget, first it chooses the number of time intervals
for training, say τ , and accordingly samples p = Bstatic/τ posts
for querying MTurk to obtain labels.
The adaptive adversary has a fixed recurring budget of
Badapt and hence, can sample p = Badapt posts every interval.
This allows the adaptive adversary to train itself with new train-
ing data (of size Badapt) every interval indefinitely. Algorithm 1
depicts adversary’s actions within a time interval (subscript t
removed for clarity).
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Algorithm 1: Adversary
input : Dδ; /* Deleted posts in this interval */
1 Sample p posts Aδ p∼ Dδ;
2 Query MTurk and obtain labels for Aδ ;
3 Obtain optimal parameters θ∗ by solving Equation (1) ;
4 return a( · ; θ∗)
B. Challenger
In the presence of such an adversary, the challenger’s goal
is to collect volunteered posts (non-damaging) from users and
selectively delete these posts in order to confuse the adversary.
As described before, Dvt is the set of posts volunteered by
users in the time interval t. Let G∗≤t be the set of decoy posts
deleted by the challenger in the current and past intervals. At
the end of interval t, the challenger collects all the volunteered
posts from the current and past intervals (except the posts that
it has already used as decoys). The available set of volunteered
posts is denoted by Dv≤t ≡ (
⋃
t′≤tDvt′)\(
⋃
t′≤tG∗t′). Note that
(x, y) ∈ Dv≤t =⇒ y = 0, i.e., the volunteered posts are non-
damaging by definition. For ease of notation, let N v := |Dv≤t|
be the number of volunteered posts collected till interval t.
Then, the goal of the challenger is to construct the decoy
set G∗t+1 ⊆ Dv≤t and delete these posts during the next time
interval t+1 in order to fool the adversary into misclassifying
these challenger-deleted non-damaging posts as user-deleted
damaging posts. Formally, we want to choose K decoy posts
(denoted by a K-hot vector w) that maximizes the negative-
log likelihood loss for the adversary’s classifier, given by the
following optimization problem,
w∗ = arg max
w
V (w;Dv≤t)
s.t. ||w||1 = K, w ∈ {0, 1}N v , (2)
where
V (w;Dv≤t) =
N v∑
i=1
−wi · log(1− a(xi; θt)) , (3)
and xi is the i-th volunteered post in Dv≤t. The cost func-
tion V (w;Dv≤t) in Equation (3) is simply the negative log-
likelihood of the adversary over the set Dv≤t weighted by a
K-hot vector w. Equation (3) uses the fact that the set only
contains non-damaging posts (i.e., yi = 0).
Consequently, w∗ optimized in such a fashion selects K
posts from the set Dv≤t that maximizes the adversary’s negative
log-likelihood loss. The set of K selected posts can be trivially
constructed as G∗t+1 = {xi : i ∈ {1, . . . , N v} ∧ wi = 1}.
The challenger deletes G∗t+1 over the next time interval t+1
(hence the adversary sees these posts as part of the deleted set
Dδt+1). Note that the challenger uses the adversary’s classifier
a( · ; θt) to create decoy posts for t+1. However, as per
Section IV-A, in interval t+1 the adversary first trains over a
sample of the deleted posts (including the decoy posts) and
updates its classifier to a( · ; θt+1) before classifying the rest
of the deleted posts of t+1. Hence, the challenger is always
at a disadvantage (one step behind).
Next, we describe three challengers corresponding to the
access types discussed in Section III-C: no access, black-box
access and monitored black-box access with a query budget.
Algorithm 2: Challenger
input : Dv, K, accessType
1 G∗ ← ∅ ;
2 if accessType = none then
/* Random challenger */
3 G∗ K∼ Dv ;
4 else if accessType = black-box then
/* Oracle challenger */
5 G∗ ← {xi : xi ∈ Dv ∧ a(xi; θ) is in the top K} ;
6 else if accessType = monitored black-box (budget Bg)
then
/* D
2 challenger */
7 Sample Bg posts for training Dv,train
Bg∼ Dv;
8 Dv,test ← Dv \ Dv,train ;
9 Query a(xi; θ) for all (xi, yi = 0) ∈ Dv,train ;
10 Obtain optimal parameters φ∗ by
solving Equation (4) ;
11 G∗ ← {xi : xi ∈ Dv,test ∧ g(xi;φ∗) is in the top K}
;
12 return G∗ ;
Random challenger (no access). We begin with the case
where the challenger has no access to the adversary’s classifier
and there is no side-information available to the challenger.
With no access to the adversary’s classification probabilities
a( · ; θt), the optimization problem in Equation (2) cannot be
solved. We introduce the naive random challenger that simply
samples K posts randomly from the available volunteered
posts Dv≤t and deletes them, i.e., G∗t+1
K∼ Dv≤t. This is the
only viable approach if the challenger has no information about
the adversary’s classifier.
Oracle challenger (black-box access). Next we consider
the challenger that has a black-box access to the adversary’s
classifier with no query budget, i.e., at any time interval t,
the challenger can query the adversary with a post x and ex-
pect the adversary’s predicted probability a(x; θt) in response
without the adversary’s knowledge. Armed with the black-box
access, oracle challenger can simply maximize Equation (2)
by choosing the top K posts with highest values for a(xi; θt).
D2 Challenger (monitored black-box access with query
budget Bg). The oracle challenger assumes an unmonitored
black-box access to the adversary with an infinite query budget
which can be hard to obtain in practice. In what follows, we
relax the access and assume a monitored black-box access with
a recurring query budget of Bg . In other words, queries to the
adversary, while being limited per interval, are also monitored
and possibly flagged by the adversary. The adversary can
simply take note of these queries as performed by a potential
challenger, hence negating any privacy benefits from injecting
decoy posts. Whenever the adversary sees a deleted post
identical to one that it was previously queried about, it can
ignore the post as it is likely non-damaging.
Here we design a challenger, henceforth dubbed D2, that
trains to select decoy posts from any given volunteered set.
In other words, the D2 challenger makes use of the monitored
black-box access to the adversary only during training. Hence
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it can be used to find the decoy posts without querying the
adversary; for example in a held-out volunteered set (separate
from the training set). Additionally, the D2 challenger queries
the adversary for only Bg posts every time interval.
We denote the challenger’s model at the beginning of
interval t by g( · ;φt−1) : X→ R parameterized by φt−1. For
a given volunteer post x, g(x;φt−1) gives an unnormalized
score for how likely the post will be mislabeled as damaging;
higher the score, higher the misclassification probability.
First, the D2 challenger samples Bg posts for training from
the available volunteered set Dv≤t collected till interval t. We
denote the train and test sets of the D2 challenger as Dv,train≤t
and Dv,test≤t of sizes Bg and N v − Bg respectively. Then, the
goal of the D2 is to find optimal parameters φt by solving a
continuous relaxation of Equation (2) presented below,
φt = arg max
φ
V˜ (φ;Dv,train≤t ) (4)
where
V˜ (φ;Dv,train≤t ) =
Bg∑
i=1
−α(xi;φ,Dv,train≤t ) log(1− a(xi; θt)) ,
and
α(xi;φ,Dv,train≤t ) =
exp (g(xi;φ))∑Bg
j=1 exp (g(xj ;φ))
,
is a softmax over the challenger outputs for all the exam-
ples in Dv,train≤t . The softmax function makes sure that 0 ≤
α( · ;φ,Dv,train≤t ) ≤ 1 and
∑Bg
j=1 α(xj ;φ,D
v,train
≤t ) = 1. The
continuous relaxation in Equation (4) allows the D2 challenger
to train a neural network model parameterized by φ via
backpropagation.
We now show that optimizing the relaxed objective in
Equation (4) results in the best objective value for Equation (2).
Proposition 1. For any given volunteered set Dv with N non-
deleted posts,
max
φ
V˜ (φ;Dv) = max
w1,...,wN
V (w1, . . . , wN ;Dv)
We present proof of the proposition in Appendix C.
Finally, the D2 challenger with optimal parameters φt com-
putes g(x;φt) for all (x, y = 0) ∈ Dv,test≤t , and constructs G∗t+1
by choosing the examples with top K values for g( · ;φt).
Algorithm 2 shows the actions of the challenger within a time
interval (subscript t removed for clarity).
C. Deceptive Learning Game
Algorithm 3 presents the game between the adversary and
the challenger. In each time interval, users independently delete
and volunteer posts (line 4). The platform/deletion-service
additionally deletes the challenger-selected decoy posts (line
5). The adversary obtains all the deleted posts and queries
the MTurk with a small subset of the posts for labels (if the
adversary has not exhausted the budget). With this labeled set
of deleted posts, the adversary trains its classifier (lines 6-
7). The challenger collects new volunteered posts (line 8) and
builds decoy posts to be injected in the next interval (line 9).
Algorithm 3: Deceptive Game
input : accessType, K
1 G∗1 ← ∅ ;
2 Dv≤0 ← ∅ ;
3 for t← 1 to n do
4 Dδt , Dvt ← Users(t) ; /* deleted and volunteered
posts of the users at interval t */
5 Dδt ← Dδt ∪G∗t ; /* user- and
challenger-deleted posts at interval t */
6 if Adversary’s budget has not exhausted then
7 a( · , θt)← Adversary(Dδt ) ;
8 Dv≤t ← (Dv≤t−1 \G∗t ) ∪ Dvt ; /* available
volunteered set */
9 G∗t+1 ← Challenger(Dv≤t,K, accessType)
10 end
This results in a real-life game between the adversary and the
challenger, where each adapts to the other. The deceptive learn-
ing game is different from the adversarial learning approaches
as we detail in Appendix B.
D. Analysis: Who Wins the Game?
In what follows, we analyze the scenarios where either the
adversary or the challenger wins the deceptive learning game.
We show that the volunteered set, Dv, plays a significant role in
deciding the winner of the game. First, we need the definition
of support of a distribution.
Definition 1 (Support). Let Ω = {x : ∀x, p(x) > 0} be the
support of distribution p(x), i.e., the set of all possible features
x with non-zero probability.
Let p+(x) be the distribution of the features of damaging
posts, with the corresponding support denoted by Ω+. Then,
a post x is in Ω+ if there is a non-zero probability that it is a
damaging post. Similarly, Ωv is the support of the distribution
of volunteered posts pv. Next, we analyze the two extreme
scenarios of non-overlapping supports (i.e., Ωv ∩ Ω+ = ∅)
and fully-overlapping supports (i.e., Ωv = Ω+). These extreme
scenarios correspond to the following simple questions respec-
tively: (a) “what if all the posts volunteered by users have
completely different features than the damaging posts?” and
(b) “what if the volunteered posts have very similar or same
features as those of damaging posts?”.
1) Non-overlapping Support: Adversary Wins:
Proposition 2 (Non-overlapping support). Assume Ωv∩Ω+ =
∅, i.e., the supports of volunteered and damaging posts do not
overlap. Then, there is always a powerful-enough adversary
to defeat the challenger.
Proof sketch: Assume the most powerful challenger who
can select any post features x from an infinite supply of volun-
teered posts. However, since Ωv∩Ω+ = ∅, there is no sampling
from pv to generate decoy examples that look like they are
sampled from p+. Hence, given enough data, an adversary can
find a perfect decision boundary between the damaging posts
and the decoy posts. Because neural networks are universal
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function approximators [41], this powerful adversary always
exists and, thus, the challenger can always be defeated in the
deceptive learning game.
An Illustrative Example: Consider the example provided
in Figure 2a. The two classes (denoted by red circles and green
crosses respectively) have non-overlapping support. We show
the decision boundary of the adaptive adversary in this setting
dataset after 50 intervals of the deceptive learning game. We
see that the adversary can perfectly label the points even in
the presence of the oracle challenger.
Real-world scenario: The non-overlapping case could
happen in an online social platform if its users are very
conservative in volunteering posts to the challenger. Consider
for example, none of the volunteered posts contained any
sensitive keyword, whereas all the damaging posts had at
least one sensitive keyword, a clear case of non-overlapping
supports. In such a scenario, the adversary will win the game
as detailed above.
2) Fully-overlapping Support: Challenger Wins:
Proposition 3 (Fully overlapping support). Assume Ωv = Ω+,
i.e., the supports of volunteered and damaging posts fully
overlap. Then, given enough volunteered posts in Dv, the
challenger always defeats the adversary (in both static and
adaptive scenarios). More precisely, if the challenger selects
k decoys per damaging post in Dδ , then the adversary’s
probability of identifying a damaging post in Dδ is in average
at most 1/(k + 1).
Proof sketch: The proof relies on a property of rejection
sampling, which states that if the support of two distributions
p1 and p2 fully overlap, then one can selectively filter samples
from p1 to make the filtered samples have distribution p2 (a
proof of this principle is given in the Appendix). Asymp-
totically, for each damaging example x in adversary’s test
data, there are k indistinguishable decoy examples (from the
adversary’s perspective). This is because, by Bayes theorem
pδ(y = 1|x) =
pδ(x|y = 1)pδ(y = 1)
pδ(x|y = 1)pδ(y = 1) + pδ(x|y = 0)pδ(y = 0) ≤
1
1 + k
,
where the superscript pδ indicates the distribution of deleted
posts Dδ . The inequality holds by construction, as for all x ∈
Dδ with label one, there are at least k ≥ 1 samples from pv(x)
with label zero.
An Illustrative Example: Consider the example provided
in Figure 2b where the two classes (red circles and green
crosses respectively) have fully overlapping supports (as they
are drawn from a Gaussian distribution with different means).
We show the decision boundary of the adaptive adversary in
this setting after 50 intervals of the deceptive learning game.
We see that for any decision boundary, there exist points in Ωv
that a challenger can choose such that the adversary mislabels
them as damaging.
Real-world scenario: The fully-overlapping case could
happen in an online social platform if the definition of what
constitutes as damaging varies across the platform’s users. For
example, user A could consider a post with a single sensitive
word (e.g., a swear word) as damaging, whereas another user
1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0.75
0.25
0.25
0.75
1.25 100% fscore
(a) Non-overlapping supports
1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0 50%  fscore
(b) Fully overlapping supports
Fig. 2: Two examples illustrating the two possible scenarios
relating to the supports of volunteered posts and damaging
posts: non-overlapping (left) and fully overlapping (right).
The black line denotes the decision boundary of the adaptive
adversary after 50 intervals of the deceptive learning game.
B from a different background might consider the same post
as completely innocuous and volunteer the post. In such a
scenario, the challenger will use volunteered posts from user B
to protect the damaging posts of user A. Hence, the challenger
will win the game against even the most powerful adversary
with infinite data.
Propositions 2 and 3 are important to understand the two
extreme cases —where either the challenger clearly wins
or the adversary clearly wins— as important insights, even
though these clear-cut cases are unlikely to happen in practice.
Most real-world applications will likely fall between these
two extremes, where the supports only partially overlap. In
such scenarios, the adversary wins outside the overlap (i.e.,
can classify everything correctly outside the overlap), and the
challenger wins inside the overlap. In other words, extremely
sensitive and damaging posts cannot be protected as they will
have no overlap with any of the volunteered posts. However,
as we show in the next section, with a reasonable volunteered
set, the challenger can make it hard for the adversary to detect
damaging deletions.
V. SYSTEM EVALUATION ON TWITTER DELETIONS
In this section we evaluate the efficiency of an adversary
when Deceptive Deletions is applied to the real-world problem
of concealing damaging deletions in Twitter. In this evaluation
we first create and prepare sets of (non)damaging tweets.
Then we use these sets to train the challenger and adversary
classifiers and analyze their performance.
A. Data Collection
In this work, we select Twitter as our experimental social
media platform. We note that it was certainly plausible to per-
form the exact experiment on other social platforms. However
we chose Twitter due to its popularity and feasibility of data
collection. Specifically, in order to evaluate the challenger we
needed a real-world dataset which includes (i) both deleted and
non-deleted tweets (i.e., Twitter posts) and (ii) deleted tweets
that contain both damaging and non-damaging tweets. To that
end, we use two data sources to create such a dataset.
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1) Deceptive Deletion dataset: We collected 1% of daily
random tweet samples from the Twitter API from Oct 2015 -
May 2018. Eliminating non-English tweets, we accumulated
over one billion tweets. In the next step, we construct the
damaging and volunteered sets.
To construct the damaging set, we first needed to identify
the deleted tweets. We sampled 300,000 tweets from the
aforementioned collected data, and leveraging the Twitter API,
we identified the tweets that were deleted at the time of our
experiment (Jan 30th, 2020). In total, we identified 92,326
deleted tweets. The next step was to obtain ground truth labels
for the deleted tweets—i.e., detect and assign “true” labels
to damaging tweets and “false” labels to rest. We used the
crowdsourcing service Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [19]
to obtain a proxy for these true labels. However, there were
two challenges– First, it was impractical to ask our annotators
to label 92,326 tweets. Second, since the dataset was highly
imbalanced, a simple random sample of tweets for labeling
would have resulted in a majority of non-damaging tweets.
Thus, we followed prior work to create a more balanced
sample dataset [65], [72]. Specifically, we filtered the deleted
tweets using a simple sensitive keyword-based approach [72]
(i.e., identify posts with sensitive keywords) to have a higher
chance of collecting possibly damaging tweets. This approach
resulted in 33,000 potentially damaging tweets, and we ran-
domly sampled 3,500 tweets to be labeled by annotators on
MTurk. The mean number of sensitive keywords in each tweet
within our data set was 2.55.
Note that, in addition to the cursing and sexual keywords,
our sensitive keyword-based approach also considered key-
words related to the topics of religion, race, job, relationship,
health, violence, etc. Intuitively, if a post does not contain
any such sensitive keywords then the likelihood of the post
being damaging is very low. We confirmed this intuition by
asking MTurk annotators to label 150 tweets which did not
contain any sensitive keyword as damaging/non-damaging. We
noted that more than 97% of these 150 tweets were labeled
as non-damaging by annotators. We surmised that in practice,
the adversary will also leverage a similar filtering approach
to reduce its overhead and increase its chances of finding
damaging posts.
In total, out of our sampled 3,500 deleted tweets, we
obtained labels for 3,177 tweets (excluding annotations from
Turkers who failed our quality control checks as described
later). Among the labeled tweets, 1,272 were identified as
damaging, and 1, 905 were identified as non-damaging.
Data labeling using MTurk. We acknowledge that ideally,
the tweet labels should have been assigned by the posters
themselves. However, since we collected random tweets at
large-scale using the Twitter API, we could not track down
and pursue original posters to label their deleted tweets. To that
end, we note that there is a crowdsourcing based alternative
which is already leveraged by earlier work to assign sensitivity
labels [25], [29], [65]. Specifically, these studies determined
the sensitivity of social media posts by simply aggregating
crowdsourced sensitivity labels provided by multiple MTurk
workers (Turkers). Thus we took a similar approach as men-
tioned next.
On MTurk, tasks (e.g., completing surveys) are called
Human Intelligence Tasks or HITs. Turkers can participate in
a survey by accepting the corresponding HIT only if they meet
all the criteria associated with that HIT (set by the person(s)
who created the HIT). We leverage this feature to ensure the
reliability of our results. Specifically we asked that the Turkers
taking our survey should: (i) have at least 50 approved HITs.
(ii) have an assignment approval rate higher than 90%, and
(iii) have their location set to United States. This last criterion
ensured consistency of our Turkers’ linguistic background. In
our experiment each HIT consisted of annotating 20 tweets
with true (damaging) or false (non-damaging) labels. We
allowed the Turkers to skip some tweets in case they feel
uncomfortable for any reason. We compensated 0.5 USD for
each HIT and on average it took the Turkers 193 seconds to
complete each HIT.
To control the quality of annotation by Turkers, we in-
cluded two hand-crafted control tweets with known labels in
each HIT. These control tweets were randomly selected from
two very small sets of clearly non-damaging or damaging
tweets and were inserted at random locations within the
selection of 20 tweets. For example a damaging control tweet
was: “I think I have enough knowledge to make a suicide bomb
now! Might need it New Year’s Eve” and non-damaging control
tweet was: “Prayers with all the people in the hurricane
irma”. If for a HIT, the responses to these control tweets did
not match the expected label, we conservatively discarded all
twenty annotations in that HIT.
We countered possible bias resulting from the order of
presentation of tweets via randomizing the order of tweets in
every HIT. Even if two Turkers annotated the same set of
tweets, the order of those tweets was different. Furthermore,
to ease the subjectivity of the labels from each participant, for
each tweet we collected the annotations of multiple Turkers
and took the majority vote. In our experiment, we created the
HITs such that each tweet was annotated by 3 distinct Turkers.
After receiving the responses, for each tweet we assigned the
final label (indicating damaging or non-damaging) based on
the majority vote.
We emphasize that in the real world, the burden of la-
beling the posts via crowdsourcing is on the adversary. The
challenger, on the other hand, can be implemented as a service
within the platform and can obtain the true labels directly from
the post-owners. Therefore, existence of any mislabeled data
will negatively impact only the adversary.
2) #Donttweet dataset: Recently Wang et al. [65] proposed
“#Donttweetthis”. “#Donttweetthis” is a quantitative model
that identifies potentially sensitive content and notifies users
so that they can rethink before posting those content on social
platforms. Wang et al. created the training data for their model
by (i) identifying possibly sensitive tweets by checking for
the existence of sensitive keywords within the text and then
(ii) using crowd-sourcing (i.e., using MTurk) to annotate the
sensitivity of each tweet by three annotators.
The data collection approach used by “#Donttweetthis”
(section 3 of [65]) is very similar to ours. Therefore, to enrich
our dataset and be able to evaluate the challenger over more
intervals, we acquired their labeled tweets. Using the Twitter
API, we queried the tweets using their corresponding IDs and
identified the deleted ones (at the time of writing, Jan 30th,
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2020). In total, we obtained 851 deleted tweets, where 418
were labeled as sensitive (damaging), and the remaining 433
were labeled as non-sensitive (non-damaging). The mean of
sensitive keywords in each tweet within this set was 1.7.
Summary of collected data. In summary, combining the
two datasets explained above, we obtained labels for 4, 028
deleted tweets establishing the user deleted set. Among the
deleted tweets 1, 690 were labeled as damaging constructing
our damaging set (D+). As we will demonstrate in the results
section, in our evaluation the four thousand labeled tweets
(larger than that of prior works [65], [72]) allows for 10
intervals for the game between the adversary and challenger.
Furthermore, for our experiment, we consider k = 1, 2, 5
(i.e., number of decoy posts for each damaging post). We
needed to accommodate these values of k and also a pool that
the challenger can make meaningful selections from. Thus,
we sampled 100, 000 non-deleted tweets uniformly at random
from the 1% of daily random tweet sample posted between
Jan 1st, 2018 – May 31st, 2018 to build the volunteered set.
The non-deleted tweets are assumed to be non-damaging. We
consider this assumption to be reasonable as if a tweet contains
some damaging content then its owner would not keep that
post on its profile. In practice, we can forgo this assumption
as the volunteer users themselves offer the volunteer posts. The
average number of sensitive keywords in each tweet in this set
was 0.41.
B. Ethical Considerations
Recall that in order to create our evaluation dataset we
needed to show some deleted tweets to Turkers for the an-
notation task. Thus, we were significantly concerned about
the ethics of our annotation task. Consequently, we discussed
at length with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the
lead author’s institute and deployed the annotation task only
after we obtained the necessary IRB approval. Next we will
detail, how, in our final annotation task protocol we took quite
involved precautionary steps for protecting the privacy of the
users who deleted their tweets.
We recognize that, in the context of our evaluation, the
primary risk to the deleted-tweet-owners was the possibility of
linking deleted tweets with deleted-tweet-owner profiles during
annotation. This intuition is supported by prior research [47],
[49] who suggested applying selective anonymization for re-
search on deleted content. Thus, we anonymized all deleted
tweets by replacing personally identifiable information or PII
(e.g., usernames, mentions, user ids, and links) with place-
holder text. For example, we replaced user accounts (i.e.,
words starting with @) and url-links with “UserAccount” and
“Link” respectively. Moreover, one of the authors manually
went over each of these redacted posts to ensure anonymization
of PII before showing them to Turkers.
C. Experiment Setup
Partitioning the data for different time intervals. Recall
from Section III that we discretize time into intervals. In our
experiments, we choose T = 10 intervals in total (a choice
made based on the number of collected tweets). Consequently,
we partition our dataset into 10 intervals. Ideally, the partitions
should be based on the creation and deletion timestamps of
the tweets. Unfortunately however, the Twitter API does not
provide deletion timestamps. Hence, we randomly shuffle the
tweets and divide them into 10 equally sized partitions.
BERT model. In line with our approach to model the most-
powerful adversary as best as we possibly can, we use a
state-of-the-art natural language processing model: the BERT
(Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers)
language model [32], both for the adversary and for the chal-
lenger. Specifically, we use BERTBASE model that consists of
12 transformer blocks, a hidden layer size of 768 and 12 self-
attention heads (110M parameters in total). BERT has been
shown to perform exceedingly well in a number of downstream
NLP tasks [32]. We use HuggingFace’s [67] implementation
of the BERT model that was already pre-trained on masked
language modeling and next sentence prediction tasks.
BERT uses WordPiece embeddings [68] to convert each
word in the input tweet to an embedding vector. The concate-
nated embedding vector is passed to the BERT neural network
model. In our experiments, we only give the text of the tweet
as input to both the adversary and the challenger to make it
amenable to the pre-trained BERT models. Other tweet features
such as deletion timestamps, number of likes, etc. could be
used by both the adversary and the challenger to improve
their performance. Note however that Propositions 2 and 3
still apply as long as the adversary and the challenger have
the same information.
We fine-tune the BERT model on our datasets as prescribed
by Devlin et al [32]. In each interval, the adversary’s classifier
is fine-tuned for the classification of tweets into damaging
and non-damaging using the negative log-likelihood loss in
Equation (1). We use a batch size of 32 and sample equal
number of damaging and non-damaging tweets in each batch.
This procedure results in better trained models as it avoids the
scenario where a randomly sampled batch is too imbalanced
(for example, no damaging tweet sampled in the batch). A
separate BERT model is fine-tuned for the challenger using
the loss function in Equation (4). Note that no balancing is
required here since all the input tweets to the challenger model
are non-damaging. We note that explaining the exact strategy
employed by BERT models to classify text is an active research
topic and complementary to our efforts. However, we highlight
that our challenger does not use any information about either
the adversary’s exact model or its parameters.
Budget constraints: We allow a limited budget of Bstatic =
200 deleted tweets for the static adversary and set τ = 1,
i.e., the static adversary only trains during the first out of
the ten intervals. Similarly for the adaptive adversary, we
allow a fixed recurring budget of Badapt = 200 deleted tweets
every interval. There are no budget restraints for random and
oracle challengers (having no access and black-box access
respectively). However, we restrict the D2 challenger to have
the same (recurring) query budget as the adaptive adversary’s
recurring budget to keep the game fair, i.e., Bg = Badapt = 200.
We simulate the deceptive learning game described in
Algorithm 3 with an adversary and a challenger, both imple-
mented as BERT language models, with 10 different random
seeds. We repeat the experiments for k = 1, 2, 5 where
k denotes the number of decoy posts added per damaging
deletion.
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Fig. 3: F-score of different adversaries (random, static, adap-
tive) when no privacy preserving deletion mechanism is in
place. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
D. Results
Figures 3 and 4 show the F-scores (with 95% confidence
intervals), precision and recall for different adversaries over 10
time intervals. We make the following key observations from
the results.
Detection of damaging deletions in social media platforms
is a serious concern. We start by considering the case where
no privacy-preserving deletion mechanism is in place (i.e., no
challenger to inject decoy deletions). In such a scenario, we
compare the efficiency of different types of adversaries ten
intervals shown in Figure 3.
The random adversary labels the posts based on the prior
distribution of the deleted tweets (around 42% damaging and
58% non-damaging every interval). As expected, the adversary
achieves a 42% precision and 58% recall resulting in an F-
score of about 48% in each interval.
As shown in Figure 3, in the first interval, the static
adversary achieves a 17 percentage points (i.e., a 35%) increase
in its F-score compared to the random adversary, and remains
almost constant over the rest of the intervals. On the other
hand, the adaptive adversary receives new training data every
interval and trains its classifier continually, and hence is able
to increase its F-score even further by about 10 percentage
points (56% increase compared to the random adversary) at
the end of the 10th interval.
This shows that even normal users of social media plat-
forms, not only celebrities and politicians, are vulnerable to
the detection of their damaging deletions. Furthermore, the
adversaries can automate this attack on a large-scale with an
insignificant amount of overhead (access to a small dataset of
posts with the corresponding labels), highlighting the neces-
sity for a much-needed privacy-preserving mechanism for the
users’ damaging deletions in today’s social platforms.
Injecting decoy deletions decreases the adversarial perfor-
mance. As explained in Sections III and IV, we consider
three challengers corresponding to the three types of accesses
to the adversary’s model – no access, black-box access, and
restricted black-box access. In the following, we compare the
performance of the adversaries in the presence of the respective
challengers against the adversaries’ performance in the absence
of any challenger.
No access: The top row of Figure 4 shows the performance
of the three adversaries (random, static, and adaptive) in the
presence of the random challenger. We observe that although
the F-score of both the static and the adaptive adversary
decreases for all values of k, the reduction is not significant
(only 7 percentage points for k=1 compared to the no-
challenger case) In fact, both the adversaries still perform much
better than the random adversary. This shows that protection
of damaging deletions in the no-access scenario is possible but
severely limited.
Black-box access: The middle row of Figure 4 shows the
performance of the adversaries in the presence of an oracle
challenger. Not surprisingly, this approach is very effective
at lowering the (static and adaptive) adversaries’ F-scores
(close to random for k=1, 2; i.e., 20 and 35 percentage point
reduction in the case of k=1 for the static and adaptive
adversary respectively compared to the no-challenger case).
We also observe a major difference between the static and
the adaptive adversaries in the presence of a competitive chal-
lenger. The static adversary retains the same recall performance
(as in the no-challenger case) but loses drastically in precision,
i.e., it classifies a large number of decoy posts as damaging.
On the other hand, the adaptive adversary tries to adapt to the
presence of decoy posts and becomes highly conservative –
retains the same precision performance (as in the no-challenger
case) but suffers heavily in the recall performance, i.e., it
classifies a large number of damaging posts as non-damaging.
Restricted black-box access: The bottom row of Figure 4
shows the performance of the adversaries in the presence of
the D2 challenger. The performance of the D2 challenger is
comparable to the oracle challenger. The adversaries’ F-scores
in the presence of the D2 challenger is close to 45% for the
case of k=1 (20 and 30 percentage point reduction for the
static and adaptive adversaries respectively compared to the no-
challenger case). We also observe a precision-recall trade-off
separating the static and the adaptive adversary (i.e., the static
adversary loses in precision, whereas the adaptive adversary
loses in recall) similar to the one described in the presence of
an oracle challenger .
Overall, we conclude that the D2 challenger is able to
successfully raise the bar for the adversaries in identifying
damaging deletions without requiring an unmonitored black-
box access with infinite query budget.
The increase of decoy posts (k) results in lower adversarial
performance with diminishing returns. While examining
each row of Figure 4 individually, we see that the performance
of the adversaries always decreases as k, the number of decoy
deletions per damaging deletion, increases. However, we also
observe that k = 1 is enough to reduce the F-scores of the
adversaries to 45% (close to the random adversary).
Since the goal of most social platforms is to retain as
many posts as possible, it would not be in the platform’s best
interests to use much larger values of k or to delete the entire
volunteered set.
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(a) Random challenger (k = 1)
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(c) Random challenger (k = 5)
(No access.) Adversaries (random, static and adaptive) in the presence of random challenger with k = 1, 2, 5.
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(d) Oracle challenger (k = 1)
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(e) Oracle challenger (k = 2)
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(f) Oracle challenger (k = 5)
(Black-box access.) Adversaries (random, static and adaptive) in the presence of oracle challenger with k = 1, 2, 5.
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(g) D2 challenger (k = 1)
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(h) D2 challenger (k = 2)
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(i) D2 challenger (k = 5)
(Restricted black-box access.) Adversaries (random, static and adaptive) in the presence of D2 challenger with k = 1, 2, 5.
Fig. 4: F-score (with 95% confidence intervals), precision and recall for the three adversaries (random, static and adaptive) in
the presence of different challengers corresponding to different accesses with k = 1, 2, 5. Key observation: D2 challenger fools
the adversaries almost as well as the oracle challenger but with a restricted black-box access.
Observation of damaging and decoy posts. In Table I in the
Appendix, we show damaging tweets (as labeled by the AMT
workers) and decoy tweets (chosen by the D2 challenger from
a set of non-deleted tweets). We observe that even though the
decoy tweets typically seem to have sensitive words, they do
not possess content damaging to the owner.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Adversarial Deception Tactics
The adversary can use different techniques to sabotage the
challenger. Here, we mention some prominent systems attacks
and their effects on the challenger.
Denial of Service attack. One of such attacks could be a
simple Denial of Service (DoS), where the attacker submits
requests for many damaging deletions to consume all the
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volunteer posts. First, we remind that the volunteered posts are
a renewable resource, not a finite resource, as the users create,
volunteer and delete posts in each time interval. Regardless, a
DOS attack is possible wherein the adversary can use up all
volunteered posts collected up until this point.
A standard way to avoid such attacks is to limit the number
of damaging deletions that can be protected for each user in
one time interval (we assume that the adversary can have
many adversarial users to help with the DoS attack but is
not allowed to use bots [24], [28], [33], [35], [61], [64]). As is
clear from Section IV-D, the challenger’s defense is dependent
on the distribution and number of volunteered posts. If there
are more adversarial users than volunteers, then the adversary
can win the game.
We implemented the DoS attack as follows: in every inter-
val, the adversary deletes as much as the standard deletions.
We observed that the F-score did not change in this situation.
Volunteer Identification attack. In a volunteer identification
attack, the adversary deletes a bunch of posts and uses the
process of doing so to identify individuals who volunteer posts
to the challenger for deletion. First, we note that in each
time interval there is a large number of posts being deleted
(> 100 million tweets daily [48]). Thus the posts deleted by
the adversary (to try to identify volunteers) and the corre-
sponding decoy deletions are mixed with other (damaging/non-
damaging/decoy) deletions. In such a case, identifying the
volunteers is equivalent to separating the decoy deletions
from the damaging deletions; reducing to the original task.
Additionally, the challenger does not delete the decoy posts at
the same time as the original damaging deletion but does so
in batches spread out within the time interval.
Further, the volunteers can also have damaging deletions of
their own. Even if an adversary is able to identify volunteers,
the adversary still needs to figure out which of the volunteer’s
deletions are decoys. If the adversary ignores all posts from
volunteers, then a simple protection for the users is to become
a volunteer, which helps our cause.
Adversary disguising as volunteer. In this attack, the
adversary can take the role of a volunteer (or hire many
volunteers) to offer posts to the challenger. Subsequently, the
challenger may select the adversary’s posts as decoys in the
later intervals; however, these posts do not provide deletion
privacy as the adversary will be able to discard these decoy
posts easily. This effect can be mitigated with the help of more
genuine volunteers and increasing the number of decoys per
damaging deletion. This points to a more fundamental problem
with any crowdsourcing approach: if the number of adversarial
volunteers is more than the number of genuine volunteers, the
approach fails.
B. Obtaining volunteered posts from users
Volunteer posts are a significant component of our system.
In Section I, we describe the possibility of obtaining these
volunteered posts via bulk deletions (i.e., whenever a user bulk-
deletes, consider the posts as “volunteered” with a guarantee
that they will be deleted within a fixed time period).
However, other strategies could be more effective, for in-
stance, one based on costs and rewards. Under such a strategy,
each user seeking privacy for his/her damaging deletions is
required to pay a cost for the service, whereas the users
that volunteer their non-damaging posts to be deleted by the
challenger (at any future point in time) are rewarded. The costs
and rewards can be monetary or can be in terms of the number
of posts themselves (i.e., a user has to volunteer a certain
number of her non-damaging posts to protect her damaging
deletion). Nevertheless, in an ideal world, the volunteered set
could also be obtained from altruistic users who offer their
non-damaging posts for the protection of other users’ deletions.
We contacted the deletion services mentioned in Section I
and shared our proposal Deceptive Deletions, for the privacy
of users’ damaging deletions. We got responses from some that
provide services for the mass deletions on Twitter, Facebook,
and Reddit. The response that we received has been positive.
They attest that, with Deceptive Deletions, an attacker that
observes the deletion of users in large numbers will have a
harder time figuring out which of the deleted posts contain
sensitive material.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show the necessity for deletion privacy
by presenting an attack where an adversary is able to increase
its performance (F-score) in identifying damaging posts by
56% compared to random guessing. Such an attack enables
the system like Fallait Pas Supprimer to perform large-scale
automated damaging deletion detection, and leaves users with
“damned if I do, damned if I don’t” dilemma.
To overcome the attack, we introduce Deceptive Deletions
(which we also denote as challenger), a new deletion mech-
anism that selects a set of non-damaging posts (decoy posts)
to be deleted along with the damaging ones to confuse the
adversary in identifying the damaging posts. These conflicting
goals create a minmax game between the adversary and the
challenger where we formally describe the Deceptive Learning
Game between the two parties. We further describe conditions
for two extreme scenarios: one where the adversary always
wins, and another where the challenger always wins. We also
show practical effectiveness of challenger over a real task
on Twitter, where the bar is significantly raised against a
strong adaptive adversary in automatically detecting damaging
posts. Specifically, we show that even when we consider only
two decoy posts for each damaging deletion the adversarial
performance (F-score) drops to 65%, 42% and 38% where
the challenger has no-access, restricted black-box access and
black-box access respectively. This performance indicates a
significant improvement over the performance of the same
adversary (75% F-score) when no privacy preserving deletion
mechanism is in effect. As a result, we significantly raise the
bar for the adversary going after damaging deletions over the
social platform.
Our work paves a new research path for the privacy
preserving deletions which aim to protect against a practical,
resourceful adversary. In addition, our deceptive learning game
can be adapted for current/future works in the domain of
Private Information Retrieval [34], [42], [50], [53] that have
similar setting for injecting decoy queries to protect the users’
privacy.
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APPENDIX
A. Deceptive Learning Game vs Generative Adversarial Net-
works
Recall that in our setting, the task of the challenger is
to select posts from a pre-defined volunteered set Dv. An
alternative approach is to use generative models [31], [39],
[46], [57], [70] to generate fake texts —see Zhang et al. [71]
for a recent survey and Radford et al. [57] for the state-of-the-
art— enabling the challenger to generate decoy posts instead
of selecting them from a pre-defined set. However, we note
that such generative models might not be favorable or even
effective in practical systems.
Let us consider the case of generating decoy posts on
Twitter. Twitter posts are attached with a persistent non-
anonymous user identities [29]. Since, uploading fake posts
from real user accounts raises serious ethical concerns, one
should create multiple bot accounts that will upload machine-
generated fake posts to be used as decoy posts (by deleting
them later). However, unfortunately, detection of bot accounts
is a well studied problem [24], [28], [33], [35], [61], [64].
Moreover, when an adversary detects a bot, any decoy post
from that bot account will be similarly unmasked. Therefore,
in non-anonymous platforms like Twitter, selecting the decoy
posts from the posts of actual users is arguably a more practical
approach.
B. Deceptive Learning Game vs Adversarial Learning
In traditional adversarial learning [30] setting, there are two
players: a classifier and an attacker. The classifier seeks to
label the inputs x (for instance, labeling emails as spam or not
spam). Now, given a set of test inputs {xi}Ni=1, the attacker’s
goal is to modify them such that the classifier will misclassify
these examples (for example, in [30], the attacker modifies
spam emails to fool the spam-detector in labeling them as
benign). The attacker is free to modify any example x as long
as humans would agree on its label (i.e., the attacker’s modified
email should still be considered as spam by humans).
Our setting, however, is different in that we are not allowed
to modify the examples. Rather, the challenger wishes to
attack the adversary’s classifier by injecting hard-to-classify
examples into the adversary’s dataset (i.e., the deletion set).
A key constraint for the challenger is that it has to select
the examples from a preexisting set of volunteered posts (i.e.,
Dv). This is because the challenger can only delete existing
posts, and cannot generate fake posts (as we discuss in the
next paragraph).
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C. Proofs
Proposition (Proposition 1.). For any given volunteered set
Dv with N non-deleted posts,
max
φ
V˜ (φ;Dv) = max
w1,...,wN
V (w1, . . . , wN ;Dv)
Proof of Proposition 1: Let S∗1 = maxφ V˜ (φ;Dv) and
S∗2 = maxw1,...,wN V (w1, . . . , wN ;Dv) be the optimum values
for the respective objective functions. First, note that S∗1 ≥ S∗2
because the optimal assignment for the discrete objective lies
within the solution space of the continuous relaxation. Next, let
Li = log(1−a(xi; θt)), where xi is the i-th post in Dv and let pi
denote a sorting over them such that Lpi1 ≥ . . . ≥ LpiN . Then,
two cases arise – (1) when the top K elements are strictly
greater than the rest, Lpi1 ≥ . . . ≥ LpiK > LpiK+1 ≥ . . . Lpi(N),
and (2) when there is atleast one element in the bottom N−K
elements that has the same value as one of the top K elements,
Lpi1 ≥ . . . ≥ LpiK = LpiK+1 ≥ . . . Lpi(N). In the former case,
the optimal solution is clearly to assign a weight of one to the
top K elements and zero to the rest. Any other assignment
(even in the continuous solution space) is clearly suboptimal.
In the latter case, although there are infinitely many optimal
solutions in the continuous domain that distribute the weights
differently among the equal elements, the value of the objective
function is the same.
Proof of Proposition 3 (cont): First we show the kind
of test distribution shift introduced by the challenger. The
challenger-injected distribution is given by the following hy-
pothetical acceptance-rejection sampling algorithm:
1) sample x ∼ pv(x)
2) sample u ∼ Uniform(0, 1) independently of x
3) while u > p+(x)/(Mpv(x)), reject x and GOTO 1, for
some constant M .
4) Accept (output) x as a sample from p+(x) but with label
y = 0, as the sample came from pv(x).
5) While number of samples less than k|D+|, GOTO 1
Next we prove that the above rejection sampling algorithm
produces samples with distribution p+(x) from examples from
decoy examples that have distribution pv(x). Let X ′ be a
sample from the algorithm described above and X ∼ p+(x),
then
p(X ′ = x) = p(X = x|Accept) = p(X = x,Accept)
p(Accept)
= p+(x)
because
P (X = x,Accept)
P (Accept)
=
P (Accept|X = x)p(X = x)
P (Accept)
=
p+(x)
Mpv(x)p
v(x)
P (Accept)
=
p+(x)
M
P (Accept)
= p+(x)
as
P (Accept) =
∫
P (Accept|X = x)p(X = x)dx
=
∫
p(x)
Mq(x)
q(x)dx
=
1
M
∫
p(x)dx =
1
M
The above ideal accept-reject sampling procedure can be
reproduced via noise contrastive estimation [40], which is
method that can generate data from a known distribution with-
out the need to know p+(x)/(Mpv(x)) in advance. A variant
of the same statistical principle is used today in generative
models using Generative Adversarial Networks [39], which
uses a minimax game similar to our procedure. Because we
train the challenger to mimic the classifier of the adversary,
it is easy to construct such rejection sampling method, such
that there are in average k decoy examples for every damaging
example in the original data.
D. Examples of Damaging and Decoy Posts
Table I presents the damaging tweets (deleted tweets that
were labeled as damaging by the AMT workers), the decoy
tweets (chosen by the D2 challenger) and the non-damaging
tweets.
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TABLE I: Sample tweet text extracts from the damaging, decoy, and non-damaging datasets. The real user accounts within the
tweets have been replaced with @UserAccount. Some letters in the offensive keywords have been replaced by *.
Tweets’ text extract Tweet Type
“#GrowingUpInTexas Seeing a black person pass by ya front yard and telling your son to pass you the shotgun so you can play shoot em ups” damaging
“@UserAccount its gods way of punishing you for your sins. fag**t.” damaging
“I think I might have the biggest douche for a boss hands down breaking point” damaging
“I don t wanna believe all the women in the auto department at walmart are lesbians Someone prove me wrong Cuz im seeing it” damaging
“Show up to work on meth once and your nickname is Tweaker for the rest of your life ” damaging
“I cook that pot them junkies treat me like Obama” damaging
“gotta love watching two gay men having sex next to my homophobic parents” damaging
“Listening to this deuchbag behind me at Chipotle diss every girl who comes in hot body but she has no face news check you re fugly” decoy
“I grab a beer from the fridge put on my Bob Marley record crank that f**ker up and light up a fat one my professor is the shit” decoy
“Kids having kids That sh*t is f**kin crazy to me I d rather be that cool ass uncle that buys the booze aaayyye” decoy
“If you know the boy is in a relationship and you continue to hook up with him yes sweetheart sorry to break it to you you re a wh*re” decoy
“This guy smacked his girlfriends ass in public That’s disrespectful” decoy
“I don’t understand why people say that watermelon and fried chicken is for black people I love that shit to Dafuq” decoy
“You think communism looks good on paper Get the hell out of America USA damncommie” decoy
“y’all I just watched “love, simon” for the first time and let me just say that the ugly tears are so f**kin real omfg” non-damaging
“I want to eat to rid my emotions but I don’t want the calories ya feel me” non-damaging
“The middle is not the end, but a process you must grow through to get to your new beginning.” non-damaging
“@UserAccount @UserAccount Did you guys win it or did you burgle it from a classmates house again?” non-damaging
“Love is not about turning human relationships into billions of isolated couples.” non-damaging
“Gonna do some coffee shop hopping tomorrow if anyone wants to join” non-damaging
“Im pretty sure one of my professors has me mistaken for another black woman in my class.” non-damaging
“Anyways, it’s 2 am and the Full House theme song is playing in my head on repeat so if you wanna beat me to death do it now please” non-damaging
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